COMMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1979
Cases construing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 in
1979, the thirteenth year since its enactment, focused on many issues

left unresolved by the prior case law. 2 Two Supreme Court decisions
and more than one hundred federal circuit and district court opinions

attempted to develop workable judicial interpretations of the statute.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,3 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of

"reverse-FOIA" suits, in which a submitter of information to a federal

4
agency seeks to prevent disclosure in response to an FOIA request.
Although the Court resolved several disputes that had arisen among

the circuit courts, it left open important issues in this area.
The year's other Supreme Court decision, Federal Open Market

Committee v. Merrill,5 concerned an agency's refusal to release
monthly policy directives while they were in effect. The Court's dispo-

sition of this case included a significant and troubling expansion of the
fifth exemption of the FOIA, the intra-agency memorandum exemption.6 Other courts dealing with this exemption in the past year analyzed the complex interaction between the FOIA and the discovery
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2. For discussion of developments under tle FOIA in prior years, see Note, Developments
Under the Freedom ofInformationAct-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327; Note, Developments Under the
Freedom ofInformation Act-1977, 1978 DuKE L.J. 189; Note, Developments Under the Freedom
of InformationAct-1976, 1977 DuKE L.J. 532; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1974, 1975 DuKE L.J. 416; Comment, Developments Underthe Freedom ofInformationAct1973, 1974 DuKE L.J. 251; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972,
1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DuKE L.J.
115, 136; Project, FederalAdministrativeLaw Developments-1970, 1971 DuKE L.J. 149, 164; Project, FederalAdministrativeLaw Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 72.
3. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
4. For discussion of reverse-FOIA suits, see Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent
Agency Disclosureof ConfidentialBusiness Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act
Lawsuit, 55 TEX. L. REv. 587 (1977); Note, Protectionfrom Government Disclosure-TheReverseFOIA Suit, 1976 DuKE L.J. 330; Comment, Reverse-Freedom ofInformation Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 995 (1976).
5. 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
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process.
Several other exemptions to the FOIA's general disclosure requirements8 received attention in 1979. Courts reviewing claims of exemption under the national security provision of the Act9 applied a new
executive order 0 to determine if the documents should be disclosed."
Cases involving statutes other than the FOIA enabled courts to refine
the scope of the Act's third exemption,' 2 nondisclosure based on a narrow and specific withholding statute.' 3 A conflict developed between
the Second and Third Circuits concerning the effect of the Consumer
Product Safety Act' 4 on FOIA disclosure. 15
Another provision producing new case law was the investigatory
records exemption;' 6 several significant cases interpreted the Supreme
Court's 1978 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 17 decision.18 The
previously ignored eighth exemption,' 9 limiting disclosure of information about financial institutions, received attention from one court in
1979.20 Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision to review several
FOIA cases 21 in its 1979-80 term promises to refine the case law even
7. See notes 138-48 infra and accompanying text.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Subsection (a) contains the Act's disclosure requirements, The
exemptions from mandatory disclosure are enumerated in subsection (b).
9. Id § 552(b)(1) (1976).
10. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 57
(West Supp. 1979). This order took effect December 1, 1978.
11. See notes 56-68 infra and accompanying text.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
13. See notes 74-111 infra and accompanying text.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
15. See notes 74-99 infra and accompanying text.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). See notes 149-88 infra and accompanying text.
17. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
18. See notes 177-88 infra and accompanying text.
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976).
20. See Gregory v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979). See text
accompanying notes 189-96 infra.
21. See Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir.
1978), rev'dsub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 48 U.S.L.W. 4293 (U.S. Mar. 19,
1980); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Vance, 589 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1978), af'g
without opinion, 442 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1977), afdinpart andrev'dinpart sub nom. Kissinger
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 100 S. Ct. 960 (1980); Forsham v. Califano, 587
F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978), af'dsub nom. Forsham v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 978 (1980). See also GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert.granted, 100 S. Ct.
479 (1979), discussed at notes 74-99 infra and accompanying text.
On March 3, 1980, the Supreme Court handed down opinions in Kissinger and Forsham. In
Kissinger, the Court held that notes of telephone conversations, accumulated while Dr. Kissinger
served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, were not "agency records." The
Court ruled that the "Office of the President"-apparently composed of the President's closest
personal advisers-is not an agency subject to the FOIA. The Court also denied a request for
similar records accumulated during Kissinger's tenure as Secretary of State. Kissinger had

Vol. 1980:139]

FOA DEVELOPMENTS

further.
This Comment will report on these developments under the Free-

dom of Information Act and will discuss their significance for the future application of the Act.
I.

REVERSE-FOIA SUITS

A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit typically arises when a

party requesting agency records is dissatisfied with the agency's refusal
to release the information and sues to compel disclosure. The FOIA
provides for an explicit right of action in such circumstances. 2 2 It does
not, however, explicitly authorize a suit by a submitter of information
to enjoin agency disclosure of that information in response to another
party's FOIA request; whether a submitter can nevertheless bring a "reverse-FOIA" suit has been a lively issue in recent years. 23 Courts have
disagreed on the source of the cause of action. They have also differed
on the proper scope of judicial review of the agency's decision to dis-

close. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 24 the Supreme Court conclusively
decided the first issue, but left open the second.
donated these notes to the Library of Congress prior to the State Department's receipt of the
FOIA request; the Court found that without possession or control of the documents, the State
Department had not "withheld" any records and accordingly could not be ordered to release
them, even if the notes might qualify as "agency records" (an issue the Court did not reach).
In Forsham, federally funded researchers generated data in a study of diabetics. Although
the research group's report resulted in proceedings by the Food and Drug Administration and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the agencies never had possession of the raw data.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of a request for this raw data, holding that
"written data generated, owned, and possessed by a privately controlled organization receiving
federal study grants are not 'agency records' within the meaning of the Act when copies of those
data have not been obtained by a federal agency subject to the FOIA." 100 S. Ct. at 980.
On March 19 a unanimous Court ruled, in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, that
requesters could not obtain information in a FOIA suit "when the agency with possession of the
documents has been enjoined from disclosing them by a federal district court," 48 U.S.L.W. at
4295. The agency's compliance with the injunction did not constitute "improper" withholding of
records; the requesters' FOIA action could therefore not succeed.
22. "[Ihe district court... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
23. See sources cited in note 4 supra. For discussion of developments in the reverse-FOIA
area in recent years, see Note, Developments Under FOIA-1978, supra note 2, at 347-53; Note,
Developments Under FOIA-1977 supra note 2, at 204-10; Note, Developments Under FOJA1976, supra note 2, at 559-63.
24. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see Note, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown:
Seeking a FormulaforResponsible Disclosure under the FOIA, 29 CATH. U.L. Rav. 159 (1979).
Chrysler, a government contractor, was required by regulation to furnish employment statistics
and affirmative action information for use by the Defense Logistics Agency in monitoring
Chrysler's employment practices. The Defense Logistics Agency informed Chrysler that third
parties had requested some of the submitted information under the FOIA, whereupon Chrysler
sued to prevent disclosure. The Third Circuit's opinion, Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d
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According to most courts that had considered the question, the
FOIA creates no private right of action to enjoin disclosure.25 In
Chrysler, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist,
adopted this majority view, as had the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
below. 26 The Supreme Court held that while exempt records (which it
assumed the documents in issue to be 27) could be withheld, the Act did

not require nondisclosure. An exemption "demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure. ' 28 The Act's clear
language and legislative history strongly support the Court's conclusion. 29 Moreover, since Congress "did not limit an agency's discretion

to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA, [it] necessarily follows that the Act does not afford.
30
sure."

. .

any right to enjoin agency disclo-

The Chrysler Court also held that the Trade Secrets Act31 did not
1172 (3d Cir. 1977), is discussed in detail in Note, Developments Under FOL4-1978, supra note 2,
at 347-53.
25. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacatedand
remanded,441 U.S. 919 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacatedandremandedsubnoma.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC,
534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Contra,Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977).
26. See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d at 1185-86.
27. 441 U.S. at 319 n.49. The court of appeals had not decided whether the trade secrets
exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976), applied to these records; it assumed it did apply for purposes of argument. The Supreme Court therefore avoided this issue, leaving open the possibility
that, on remand, the court would find the exemption inapplicable and require disclosure.
28. 441 U.S. at 292. But see note 82 infra.
Language in an earlier Supreme Court opinion presaged the Chrysler Court's permissive construction of the exemptions. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court stated that the FOIA's
exemptions "set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether material may be withheld or must be disclosed." Id at 79 (emphasis added). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at
290 n.9.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976) merely states that subsection 552(a), containing the Act's disclosure requirements, "does not apply" to records subject to one of the nine exemptions. This in no
way affects an agency's discretion to disclose. Moreover, as the Chrysler opinion noted, 441 U.S.
at 292, the FOIA's jurisdictional provision grants courts authority only to mandate disclosure, not
to bar it. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
The legislative history cited by the Court, 441 U.S. at 294 n.16, also contains language indicating the statute is permissive. On several occasions, the House Report plainly refers to exemption from disclosure as permissive rather than mandatory. H.R. REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, 5-7, reprintedin[1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2419, 2422-24.
30. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 294. It also follows that a submitter cannot recover
money damages under the FOIA for disclosure of exempt information. In King v. Califano, 471
F. Supp. 180 (D.D.C. 1979), the court held first that damages were not recoverable for violations
of the FOIA and second, citing Chrysler,that disclosure of exempt information would not violate
the FOIA.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), which provides in part:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or
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afford Chrysler a private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation

of the statute. Justice Rehnquist noted that because the Trade Secrets
Act was a criminal statute, the Court would imply a private right of
action only if a clear basis for the inference existed in the statute or its
legislative history.32 The Court discovered none.33 Moreover, it found
such an inference to be unnecessary in light of its decision that section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act 34 provided Chrysler with a
basis for judicial review of the agency's determination to disclose. 35 Although violation of the Trade Secrets Act could not be enjoined in a
private action under that statute, "any such violation may have a dispositive effect on the outcome of judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 10 of the APA."'36 Since the Trade Secrets Act places
substantive limits on agency action, Chrysler could seek review under
the Administrative Procedure Act as a person "adversely affected or
aggrieved" 37 by such action.
The Court did not, however, decide what standard of review a
court conducting an Administrative Procedure Act review of the
agency's decision to disclose should employ. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals had decided that certain agency regulations 38 constituted
agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any
extent not authorizedby law any information... which.. . concerns or relates to the
trade secrets [or confidential business information] of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
(Emphasis added).
32. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (discussing circumstances in which court will imply
private right of action).
33. 441 U.S. at 316-17.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), which provides in part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judical review thereof."
35. 441 U.S. at 317. The agency's decision is reviewable only if final. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
"This is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather an exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement." Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 731 (1980); see Hedley v. United States, 594 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1979). Jurisdiction to review agency action under the APA is found in the general federal question statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 317 n.47; Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
36. 441 U.S. at 317. Two recent cases from the District of Columbia District Court hold that
the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), is not violated when material exempt under the
FOIA is released to state attorneys general by the Federal Trade Commission. In both Martin
Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338 (D.D.C. 1979), and Interco, Inc. v. FTC, 478 F. Supp.
103 (D.D.C. 1979), section 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976),
was held to constitute authorization by law to release exempt data. The Martin Mariettaopinion
recognized that the Federal Trade Commission Act did not permit the agency to disclose trade
secrets, as opposed to other confidential business information, but the court found that the documents contained no trade secrets. 475 F. Supp. at 342.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
38. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1 to 40.4 (1979).
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"authorization by law" to disclose within the meaning of the Trade
40
Secrets Act,39 and that the Act did not therefore prohibit disclosure.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals on this issue,
although it agreed that "properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations" 41 could serve as the authorization by law to disclose information otherwise subject to the Act's prohibition. After an extensive
analysis of the question, the Court found that the particular regulations42 the agency relied on to support disclosure were neither substantive nor properly promulgated. The regulations were not substantive
rules having the force and effect of law because they were not reason43
ably within congressional delegations of authority under the FOIA,
under the "housekeeping statute" for executive agencies, 44 or under
any other legislative enactment cited by the agency in question. 45 Furthermore, procedural defects in the adoption of the regulations precluded them from acquiring the force of law.4 6 The Court therefore
vacated the Third Circuit's determination that disclosure was "author39. See note 31 supra.
40. 565 F.2d at 1186, 1188.
41. 441 U.S. at 295. A substantive rule, unlike interpretative rules and general statements of
agency policy or procedure, affects individual rights and obligations. To be accorded the force of
law, the regulation must be the "product of a congressional grant of legislative authority." Id at
303. It must also be promulgated in accordance with the APA's requirements of notice of the
proposed rule and opportunity to comment before promulgation. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
42. See note 38 supra.
43. Records exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA are "outside the ambit of
that Act." 441 U.S. at 303. The Act cannot, therefore, serve as the authorization for regulations
permitting disclosure. Id at 303-04.
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (providing in part: "The head of an Executive department...
may prescribe regulations for. . . the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and
property. This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public"). Relying upon the statute's legislative history, the Court
concluded that the Act was meant only to allow "housekeeping"--agency regulation of internal
affairs-and not to authorize release of trade secrets or confidential business information. 441
U.S. at 310-12. The Court thereby disagreed with the opinion of the lower court, siding with the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision on this issue in Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD, 519
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
45. The agency relied upon the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,40
U.S.C. §§ 471-514 (1976), the Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5108, 5314-5316, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e17 (1976), and Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4,
2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). However, the Court stated that Congress did not envision, much less
authorize, the disclosure regulations cited in note 38 supra by enacting any of these statutes. 441
U.S. at 306.
46. 441 U.S. at 312-16. Section 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), exempts "interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" from
that section's procedural requirements of affording notice of and opportunity to comment on the
proposed rule. The Secretary of Labor published the regulations relevant in the Chrysler case, 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-40.1 to 40.4 (1979), without adhering to the requirements of section 553, and called
the regulations interpretative and thus not subject to the restrictions. 38 Fed. Reg. 3192, 3193
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ized by law," and remanded the case for consideration of the issue in
light of its decision.47
Because the Third Circuit did not resolve "whether the contemplated disclosures would violate the prohibition of § 1905,"48 and because "the decision regarding this substantive issue-the scope of
§ 1905-will necessarily have some effect on the proper form of judicial
review pursuant to [the APA], ' 4 9 the Court decided that expressing a

view of the appropriate standard would be premature.5 0 It remains unclear, therefore, whether a court should conduct de novo review, as ar-

gued by plaintiff submitters in reverse-FOIA suits, or merely a review

51
of the agency record, as urged by defendant agencies.
As Justice Marshall noted in his brief concurrence in Chrysler, the

number and complexity of the issues addressed by the Court in this
case "tend[s] to obscure the dispositive conclusions.1 52 In essence, the
(1973). This procedure reinforced the Court's conclusion that the regulations should not have the
force and effect of law. 441 U.S. at 314-15.
47. 441 U.S. at 318-19. Compare Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Department of HEW, 464
F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (decided several months before Chrysler) with Chrysler. The court
in Westchester held that an HEW regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 422.435(c) (1979), constituted authorization to disclose information otherwise subject to the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
As in Chrysler, the court examined the validity of the regulation as a substantive rule having the
force of law. It decided that the regulation was contemplated by section 1106 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976), had been properly promulgated, and was therefore valid. The
court entered judgment for the agency and against the plaintiff submitter. In accord are two cases
decided after Chrysler. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1979); Cedars
Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
48. 441 U.S. at 319. The court of appeals had decided only that disclosure was authorized by
the cited regulation; it did not consider what the effect of the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976), would be if the regulations did not authorize disclosure. See Chrysler Corp. v.. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d at 1192. On remand, the Third Circuit decided that the district court should
resolve the questions left open in Chrysler. The appellate court therefore remanded the case to the
district court, with directions to order the agencies to make a new determination of the disclosure
issue in light of the various court opinions. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 46 Ad. L.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1979).
49. 441 U.S. at 319.
50. The court did state that "[dJe novo review by the District Court is ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a contemplated disclosure runs afoul of§ 1905," id, but explicitly reserved
judgment on the question. Other unresolved issues include "the relative ambits of Exemption 4
and § 1905" and whether section 1905 is an exempting statute within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (1976). 441 U.S. at 319 n.49.
51. A brief discussion of pre-Chrysler cases deciding which standard of review to apply can
be found in Lynch, Cohn, & Vladek, Exemption 4, in LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT 28-29 (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978). The district court in United Technologies Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845 (D. Conn. 1979), noting that the question of the
scope of review was pending before the Supreme Court in Chrysler, declined to decide the issue.
Instead, it concluded that the submitter failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits under
either standard, and denied the motion for preliminary relief enjoining disclosure. Id at 855 n.15.
52. 441 U.S. at 319 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Court held that submitters seeking review of an agency's decision to

disclose exempt information must utilize the Administrative Procedure
Act, rather than the FOIA or the Trade Secrets Act, as the source of the

cause of action. The scope of judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act is uncertain, but it is clear that agency regulations constitute "authorization by law," permitting disclosure despite the substantive constraints of the Trade Secrets Act, only if they are
substantive and procedurally proper. Whether this guidance will prove
the disparate approaches of the courts of appeal
sufficient to harmonize
3
5
remains to be seen.

II.

NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION

Exemption 1 of the FOIA54 applies only when an executive order,
for purposes of national security, permits classification of the requested
material and the procedural requirements of the order have been followed.5 5 The terms of the executive order dealing with classification of
national security information, therefore, directly affect the outcome of
an FOIA suit in which the agency withholds records based on this exemption. On June 28, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order
No. 12,065, entitled "National Security Information," which took effect
on December 1, 1978.56 While this new executive order left most of the
substantive and procedural criteria of the prior executive order5 7 unal53. The executive branch has announced its position on the issues the Chrysler Court left
unresolved. Memorandum from Robert L. Saloschin, Director, Office of Information Law & Policy, Dep't of Justice, to All Federal Dep'ts & Agencies 4 (June 15, 1979) (stating that the Justice
Department does not consider the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), a withholding statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976)). See note 50 supra for a description of the unresolved issues. The Justice Department also asserts that the scope of the Trade
Secrets Act is narrower than the literal language would suggest. Memorandum, supra at 5. See
also Letter from Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, to All Agency
General Counsels (June 21, 1979) (summarizing Chrysler from the government's point of view
and advising agencies how to respond to actual and potential reverse-FOIA problems in the future).
Legislative action to counter the Chrysler decision is also possible. Senator Robert Dole has
announced plans to introduce legislation to eliminate the Court's restrictions on reverse-FOIA
suits. The purpose of the proposal would be to prevent the use of the FOIA as "an instrument for
industrial espionage." 125 CONG. REc. S4504 (daily ed. April 23, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
55. Exemption 1 exempts matters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." Id
56. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 57
(West Supp. 1979).
57. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprintedin 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 note, at 1839 (1976), as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11,714, 3 C.F.R. 764 (1971-1975 Compilation), and Exec. Order No. 11,862, 3 C.F.R. 997 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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tered, several important changes were effected.58
Three significant changes made by the new executive order should
be noted. First, it imposes slightly stricter minimum standards of classification. Whereas the old order permitted authorized officials to classify material as confidential if "its unauthorized disclosure could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, ' 59 Executive Order No. 12,065 stipulates that information is properly classified as confidential if its unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be
'60
expected to cause identjqable damage to the national security.
Whether the change in language will have an appreciable effect on officials authorized to classify documents, or on the courts, remains to be
seen. The language suggests, however, that the President's intent was
to limit the availability of classification by requiring a more concrete
demonstration of potential damage to the nation's security.
A second change is that the new order incorporates a provision
found in the National Security Council directive implementing the
prior order, 6' to the effect that any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of declassification. The new order states: "If there is
reasonable doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the information should be classified at all, the less restrictive designation
' 62
should be used, or the information should not be classified."
Third, section 3-303 of Executive Order No. 12,065 states that information should be declassified if "the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably be
expected from disclosure. ' 63 This determination is to be made by an
official responsible for processing FOIA requests or an official with Top
Secret classification authority.64 The balancing test is new; Exemption
58. See Halperin, Exemption (b)(1), in LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FREEDOM OF IN12-13 (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978).
59. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § I(C), 3 C.F.R. 679-80 (1971-1975 Compilation).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-104, 3 C.F.R. at 191 (1979) (emphasis added). The standards
for classifying matter as "secret" (serious damage) and "top secret" (exceptionally grave damage)
are unchanged. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,065, §§ 1-102 & 1-103, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1979), with
Exec. Order No. 11,652, §§ I(A) & I(B), 3 C.F.R. 679 (1971-1975 Compilation). As the FOIA
requires only that the records be "classified," the minimum standard ("identifiable damage to the
national security") is the relevant one in FOIA litigation.
61. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,053 (1972), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 note, at 1843 (1976).
62. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-101, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1979). The National Security Council
directive states that any "'substantial doubt" should be so resolved; the new order speaks of "reasonable doubt"-again, a standard more favorable to the FOIA requester.
63. Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 3-303, 3 C.F.R. 197 (1979).
64. Id" Section 1-201 lists those officials with authority to classify documents as top secret and
states that the President may designate others. President Carter exercised this authority on June
28, 1978, the same day he issued Exec. Order No. 12,065. 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprintedin 50
U.S.C.A. § 401 note, at 64 (West Supp. 1979).
FORMATION AcT
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1 does not indicate that the public's interest in disclosure is necessarily
a relevant consideration, 65 and the prior order contained no such provision.6 6 It is too soon to tell what the effect of this rule and the other
new aspects of President Carter's order will be,6 7 but the order is clearly
designed to decrease the use of classification when withholding the doc-

68
ument from the public serves no legitimate purpose.
Interestingly, the year's most significant case concerning Exemption 1 did not discuss the new executive order. In Hayden v. National

Securi y Agency/Central Security Service,69 Tom Hayden and Jane
Fonda sought disclosure of information obtained through National Se-

curity Agency monitoring of foreign electromagnetic signals. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the agency had
made the public record as complete as possible, as required by Vaughn
65. One commentator asserts that section 3-303 "open[s] up substantial new possibilities and
is in effect an amendment to exemption (b)(1)." Halperin, supra note 58, at 13. This conclusion is
misleading. While the provision is potentially of great significance, it in no way "amends" the
FOIA. The first exemption permits agencies to withhold only those materials that meet the substantive and procedural precepts of an executive order. The FOIA does not define or limit the
terms of this order, the public interest provision is merely a new term in the executive order, not a
change in the FOIA itself.
66. Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 12, 3 C.F.R. 689 (1971-1975 Compilation), did provide for
access by historical researchers and former government officials, on a case-by-case basis. The new
order contains a similar provision in section 4-3, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1979). This rule, however, differs
substantially from the public interest balancing test of section 3-303 of Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3
C.F.R. 197 (1979), as evidenced by the continued presence of the researcher-former official provision in Exec. Order. No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979).
67. Although several 1979 cases mentioned the new order, none reached particularly significant conclusions. Two cases referred to the public interest balancing test of section 3-303. In
Kanter v. Department of State, 479 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1979), the court determined that the
documents were exempt under subsection (b)(1), after having ordered the defendant to perform
the balancing test of section 3-303. Although the court stated that balancing was not required in
all cases, it held that it could determine when balancing was necessary as part of its scrutiny of the
agency's compliance with the order's procedural guidelines. In ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277
(7th Cir. 1979), Judge Cummings, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted that "the Executive order requires the declassification of documents when, as here, there is a 'public interest in
disclosure of the information.'" Id at 285 n.3. The majority did not address the question.
Three cases discussed the FOIA's requirement that segregable portions of withheld documents be disclosed, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). All three concluded that the segregability requirement applied to Exemption 1 withholdings, drawing support from the new and old executive
orders and the legislative history of section 552(b). See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v.
Bell, 603 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the legislative history); Lamont v. Department of
Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discussing and applying Exec. Order No. 12,065; Baez
v. CIA, No. 76-1920 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1979) (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,065). Both executive
orders state that specific items of information-portions of documents rather than entire documents or files-may be classified. See Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 4(A), 3 C.F.R. 682 (1971-1975
Compilation); Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-504, 3 C.F.R. 194 (1979).
68. In keeping with this goal, section 3 of the order details an extensive downgrading and
declassification procedure. 3 C.F.R. 196-99 (1979).
69. 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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v. Rosen, 70 despite its refusal to itemize publicly the documents being

withheld pursuant to the national security exemption. Judge Wilkey,
writing for the majority, accepted the agency's argument that disclosure

of the existence of the records, as well as their content, could be withheld on the theory that in some instances the existence of particular
records is more sensitive than their substance. Since the court believed

that public acknowledgement of the monitoring could endanger the national security, the FOIA did not require disclosure.7 1 72Under the circumstances, therefore, the public record was adequate.
III.
A.

FEDERAL STATUTES EXEMPTION
73

The ConsumerProduct Safety Act.

As amended in 1976, 74 Exemption 3 of the FOIA deals with fed-

eral statutes that either require withholding information or, alternatively, specify the criteria for withholding or refer to particular matters
to be withheld. 75 Cases interpreting the third exemption thus hinge on
the court's construction of a statute other than the FOIA, and a subsequent determination whether the information requested falls within the

ambit of that withholding statute. Two recent cases, Pierce & Stevens
Chemical Corp. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission,76 and GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,77 examined the Consumer Product Safety Act7 8 and reached
70. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
71. Cf. Walter, Conston, Schurtman & Gumpel, P.C. v. United States Dep't of Justice, No.
79-2918 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1979). The court in Walter held that in an Exemption 7(A) context,
where an index of the withheld records would "afford prospective defendants with a complete
insight into the case being compiled against them," the index need not be made public. The court
characterized its holding as consistent with the national interest and the purposes of the FOIA.
72. The court also held that an in camera inspection of the records was unnecessary, and that
an affidavit submitted for in camera consideration, without the presence of opposing counsel, was
sufficient under the circumstances to establish that the documents were within the exemption. 608
F.2d at 1388.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
74. Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976). The original Exemption 3, Pub. L. No.
89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), applied to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."
Following the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the exemption in FAA v. Robertson,
422 U.S. 255 (1975), Congress narrowed the scope of the exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. I,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 2183, 2204-05.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976), which exempts matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . , provided that such statute (A)
requires that thb matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld.
Id
76. 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976).
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different conclusions regarding that Act's effect on FOIA disclosure.79
This significant conffict between the Second and Third Circuits may
eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court. 80
In both cases, submitters of information to the Consumer Product
Safety Commission sued to prevent disclosure of information in response to an FOIA request. The submitters claimed that disclosure
would be inconsistent with section 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product
Safety Act,"' which they interpreted to be an Exemption 3 withholding
statute.82 Section 6(b)(1) provides that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, before publicly disclosing information submitted to it,
must both notify the submitter of its decision to disclose and insure that
the information is accurate. 83 In neither Pierce& Stevens nor GTE Sylvania had the Consumer Product Safety Commission complied with
section 6(b)(1). 8 4 The Consumer Product Safety Commission argued
79. The Second Circuit's decision in Pierce & Stevens and the district court's opinion in GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 443 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977), aJ'd, 598
F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert.granted 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979), are discussed in Note, Developments Under
F014-1978, supra note 2, at 334-35.
80. It is especially important for the Supreme Court to resolve conflicts between courts of
appeals in the reverse-FOIA area. The opportunity for submitters to select a favorable forum, to
the disadvantage of FOIA requesters, necessitates Supreme Court review. See Lynch, Cohn, &
Vladek, supra note 51, at 26-27, and cases cited therein (discussing forum shopping). The
Supreme Court decided on March 19, 1980, a case involving the forum shopping problem. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 48 U.S.L.W. 4293 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1980). The court held,
reversing the appellate court, that a FOIA requester was precluded from litigating his disclosure
action by the district court decision in GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 443
F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1977), aI'd, 598 F.2d 790 (3d Cir.), cert.granted, 100 S. Ct. 479 (1979) (the
court of appeals' affirmance is discussed in text accompanying notes 77-79 supra and 81-99 infra),
which had sustained the submitter's suit to enjoin agency disclosure.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976).
82. In a reverse-FOIA suit it is obviously an abuse of discretion for an agency to release
information when a statute prohibits it from doing so. In this sense, Exemption 3 is mandatory
rather than permissive. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d at 800.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976) provides in part:
[The Commission shall, to the extent practicable, notify, and provide a summary of the
information to, each manufacturer or private labeler of any consumer product to which
such information pertains, if the manner in which such consumer product is to be designated or described in such information will permit the public to ascertain readily the
identity of such manufacturer or private labeler, and shall provide such manufacturer or
private labeler with a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the Commission in
regard to such information. The Commission shall take reasonable steps to assure, prior
to its public disclosure thereof, that information from which the identity of such manufacturer or private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of
this chapter.
84. The Consumer Product Safety Commission did not argue that the material could be released under section 6(b)(l); it acknowledged that it was inaccurate and misleading. See GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d at 799-800; Vf. Pierce & Stevens
Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d at 1388 n.28 (encourag-
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that the section applies only when the Commission disseminates information to the public on its own initiative, rather than when it merely
responds to an FOIA request. In Pierce & Stevens, the court adopted
the Consumer Product Safety Commission's position, thereby permitting the Commission to disclose; 85 the GTE Sylvania court, on the other
hand, rejected that argument, holding that section 6(b)(1) pertains to
either type of disclosure, that it is an Exemption 3 withholding statute,
86
and that consequently the agency could not disclose.
Judge Feinberg's decision for the Second Circuit in Pierce & Stevens attempted to interpret the Consumer Product Safety Act so as to
minimize its conflict with the FOIA. Whereas the FOIA calls for
prompt disclosure, 87 the notification procedures of the Consumer Product Safety Act take much longer. 88 Moreover, the Consumer Product
Safety Act, by advising an agency to review or rewrite a document to
make it more accurate, 89 contrasts with the FOIA, which mandates disclosure only of existing documents, less any exempt portions. Finally,
ing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to include with the records the submitter's statement regarding their inaccuracy).
85. 585 F.2d at 1386-89. Of course, if the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 20512081 (1976), does not prohibit disclosure, the FOIA presumably mandates release. But see 585 F.
Supp. at 1389 ("On this view, we need not resolve the argument between the parties over whether
section 6(b)(1) meets the criteria of exemption three").
86. 598 F.2d at 814-16.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) requires that the agency determine whether to release the records
within 10 days after reviewing the request, and decide any appeal within 20 days. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(B) defines certain "unusual circumstances," not relevant here, in which these deadlines
may be extended. Courts differ on when circumstances are so unusual as to allow the agency to
have additional time pursuant to this subsection or subsection (a)(6)(C). See Spectator Publishing
Co. v. CIA, No. 78-1705 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1979). That case held, based on an undisputed
agency affidavit, that the CIA was entitled to additional time because it had demonstrated that
"exceptional circumstances" exist and the agency is responding to the request with "due diligence." Slip op. at 4 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976)). The court decided that handling
appeals in order of receipt, processing by means of a "first in, first out" system, and handling
FOIA and Privacy Act claims together demonstrated the agency's due diligence. The high volume
of requests matched against the agency's limited personnel and funding constituted the exceptional circumstances. Id. at 7-8. Other cases involving workload delays are discussed in Note,
Developments Under F04-1977, supra note 2, at 197-99; Note, Developments Under FOL41976, supra note 2, at 533-38.
Several Congressmen introduced bills in 1979 to amend the FOIA's time limitations on
agency action. See H.R. 2625, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by Rep. Divine) (increasing the initial response time from 10 to 30 days and enabling the agency to obtain extensions more
easily); H.R. 4883, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by Rep. Hyde) (similar provisions);
H.R. 5129, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (introduced by Rep. McClory) (requiring the agency to
notify the requester within 30 days as to the number of pages encompassed by the request, but
allowing the agency to decide at a later time whether to disclose, depending on the number of
pages of records in issue).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976), which requires "not less than 30 days" notice to the submitter prior to public disclosure.
89. Id
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the Consumer Product Safety Act expressly incorporates the nine exemptions of the FOIA;90 this led the court to conclude that Congress
did not intend to affect FOIA disclosure of nonexempt documents.91
In a brief discussion of legislative intent, 92 the Pierce & Stevens
court focused upon a statement contained in a congressional committee
report studying amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act after
its enactment. 93 The court concluded, as had the authors of the report,
that section 6(b)(1) and the FOIA addressed different questions: the
Consumer Product Safety Act provision referred to public disclosure
initiatedby the Commission; the FOIA contemplated "passive" release
in response to a valid request by another party.94 This construction of
the conflict between
the two statutes, the court believed, minimized
95
both.
of
goals
the
them and effectuated
The more extensive opinion in GTE Sylvania disputed the Pierce&
Stevens argument point by point, concluding that the provisions of section 6(b)(1) apply to FOIA disclosures as well as to Commission-initiated publication. The court explained that the "public disclosure"
referred to in section 6(b)(1) could be understood-based on an analysis of the legislative history and statutory language-only as "encompassing disclosure to members of the public through the FOIA." 96 Any
potential conflict between the Consumer Product Safety Act and the
FOIA was avoided by the court's finding that section 6(b)(1) qualifies
90. Id § 2055(a)(1).
91. 585 F.2d at 1388.
92. Id at 1387.
93. H.R. REP. No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1017, 1029.
94. 585 F.2d at 1386, 1388. See H.R. REP. No. 1022, supra note 93, at 27, reprintedin [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1017, 1029. The court conceded that disclosure to the FOIA
requester might result in widespread publication, but explained that "in contrast to publicity releases by the Commission, there is no government imprimatur on the document in that situation."
585 F.2d at 1388.
95. 585 F.2d at 1388.
96. 598 F.2d at 803. The court's statutory analysis is somewhat unpersuasive. It noted that
the FOIA exemptions were incorporated in the same section as the disclosure provisions--section
6(b)(1)-and relied on this fact to show that the disclosure provisions refer to FOIA disclosure,
However, the statute can easily be read, as it was by the Pierce& Stevens court, as referring to the
FOIA exemptions only as a limitation upon Commission-initiated dissemination that otherwise
satisfies the criteria set forth in section 6(b)(1). Similarly, the GTE Sylvania court is not persuasive
in arguing that section 6(b)(2), by enumerating exceptions to section 6(b)(1) but not including the
FOIA among them, implicitly places FOIA requests within the ambit of section 6(b)(1). Only if
disclosure pursuant to the FOIA is reached by section 6(b)(1) initially would the absence of an
exemption be relevant; the section 6(b)(2) exemptions are all matters to which section 6(b)(1)
would unquestionably apply but for section 6(b)(2). More convincing is the court's discussion of
legislative history, 598 F.2d at 804-12, citing the various debates and reports, and arguing that the
subsequent history contained in the committee report considering Consumer Product Safety Act
amendments, relied upon in Pierce & Stevens, is entitled to little weight.

Vol. 1980:139]

FO,

DEVELOPMENTS

as a withholding statute under Exemption 3:
By the very fact that Exemption 3 incorporates specific nondisclosure

statutes into the general scheme of the FOIA, inconsistencies will
arise as agencies attempt to comply with those specific statutes while

processing FOIA requests. Exemption 3 was designed to provide the
agencies97with the flexibility needed to accommodate those inconsistencies.

The court agreed with the district judge's determination that the statute
established particular criteria for withholding as required by Exemption 3. Nondisclosure is permitted under section 6(b)(1) only when the
information would identify the manufacturer and the Consumer Product Safety Commission has not taken, or cannot take, "reasonable steps
to assure that disclosure would be accurate, fair and related to the Act's
purposes. The standards set forth in section 6(b)(1) are sufficiently definite that they provide a reviewing Court with criteria to measure the
Commission's compliance with Congress' intent."98 Holding that section 6(b)(1) is a withholding statute, and that the material was within
the statute's nondisclosure provisions, the court permanently enjoined
the Commission from releasing the records. 99 The disparate approaches of the GTE Sylvania and Pierce& Stevens courts are perplexing: the courts attack the problem from completely different starting
points and fail to agree on a single issue relevant to the litigation. How
the Supreme Court, the other courts of appeals, and the Congress respond will significantly affect the future application of the FOIA.
B.

Other FederalStatutes.

Although the Consumer Product Safety Act precipitated a significant controversy in 1979, most courts considering the applicability of
Exemption 3 during the year discussed other federal laws. One statute
construed in many cases1°° was section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code, a provision entitled "Confidentiality and Disclosure of Returns
and Return Information."' 0'1 All the courts interpreting that provision
agreed that it qualified as an Exemption 3 withholding statute; 10 2 the
97. Id at 813.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id at 814-15.
Id at 816.
See cases cited in note 102 infra.
I.R.C. § 6103. This is an extremely long provision that details to whom, and under what

conditions, various types of information can be disclosed.
102. See, e.g., Breuhaus v. IRS, 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979); Long v. United States IRS, 596
F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 82

(1979); Stephenson v. IRS, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Britt v. IRS, 79-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. T 9450 (D.D.C. 1979); Dixon v. IRS, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9510 (N.D. Cal. 1979).

9406 (M.D. Ala. 1979); Anastas v.
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more significant question in several cases was whether the information
sought to be withheld by the Internal Revenue Service actually fell
within the ambit of section 6103.103

Statutory provisions concerning information gathered by the intelligence community' °4 also received considerable attention from both
the federal judiciary and the Congress. Several courts discussed

whether the FOIA requires the Central Intelligence Agency and the
National Security Agency to disclose particular records.' 0 5 A Con-

gressman has proposed legislation 0 6 that would significantly restrict a
FOIA requester's ability to obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. 107
Courts also decided Exemption 3 cases involving such diverse
103. See, e.g., Breuhaus v. IRS, 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979) (letter dealing with termination tax
upon liquidation of tax-exempt private foundation was exempt from FOIA disclosure under
I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2), but disclosure to a Congressman was authorized under I.R.C. § 6103(t)(1); in
addition, I.R.C. § 6104 did not apply because the letter was not an application for tax-exempt
status); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.) (disclosure would "seriously impair Federal
tax administration" within the meaning of I.R.C. §§ 6103(c) and 6103(e)(6); documents constitute
"return information" as defined by section 6103(b)(2)), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 82 (1979); Anastas
v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9510 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
104. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3), 403g (1976). Section 403(d)(3) provides in part: "[Tihe Director
of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure." Section 403g provides that to implement subsection 403(d)(3), the CIA
is exempt from "the provisions of any. . . law which require[s] the publication or disclosure of
the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by
the Agency.
... Many courts have held that section 403g is an exempting statute. See, e.g.,
National Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Social Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978);
Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
105. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. National Security Agency, 610 F.2d
824 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (construing Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6(a), 73 Stat. 64 (1959) (current version at 50
U.S.C. § 402 (1976)), which reads in part: "[N]othing in this Act or any other law. . . shall be
construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security
Agency.. ."); Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1979); Ray v. Turner, 468 F. Supp. 730
(D.D.C. 1979); Medoffv. United States CIA, 464 F. Supp. 158 (D.N.J. 1978).
106. H.R. 5129, supra note 87; see 125 CONG. RFc. H7142 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. McClory).
107. The bill is entitled "A bill to enhance the foreign intelligence and law enforcement activities of the United States by improving the protection of information necessary to their effective
operation." H.R. 5129, supra note 87. It would amend 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976) by broadening the
scope of this exempting statute. It would also amend the FOIA by preventing convicted felons or
their agents from utilizing the Act to acquire records from intelligence or law enforcement agencies, and by altering various provisions in the FOIA to exempt many records of such agencies
from the Act's purview. The bill, which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Government Operations, is a reaction to the "significant toll"
that the FOIA has allegedly taken "on the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies
to perform their congressionally authorized functions." Letter from Rep. Robert McClory to Congressional Colleagues 1 (July 27, 1979).
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matters as a criminal investigation by the Postal Service, 08 whether
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) qualifies as an Exemption 3 statute, 10 9 and the right of a FOIA requester to patent applications and
related information."10 While some of the decisions are interesting and
potentially significant, their primary importance is that they demonstrate the ongoing process of straightforward classification of statutes
under the amended Exemption 3.111
IV.

A.

INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION

Confidential CommericialInformation.

Exemption 5 of the FOIA permits agencies to withhold "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an
agency." 1 2 Several significant federal cases last year interpreted this
exemption and its relationship to the federal discovery rules. "3 In Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill,' 14 a committee of the Federal
Reserve System refused, pursuant to regulation,' '5 to disclose monthly
monetary policy directives to the public during the month the directives
were in effect. These Domestic Policy Directives indicate what monetary policy the Federal Open Market Committee has decided to pursue
in that month." 6 The Federal Open Market Committee argued that
108. Church of Scientology v. United States Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1979) (remanding to the district court for a decision whether, in light of the 1976 amendment of Exemption
3, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976), the investigatory file exemption of the Postal
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 410(c)(6) (1976), is an Exemption 3 statute).
109. Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that
the rule is not a "statute" for purposes of Exemption 3).
110. Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the Exemption 3
status of section 122 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976), and holding that whereas documents are exempt "insofar as they relate to pending and abandoned applications,. . . [they are]
fully subject to [the FOIA] insofar as they relate to applications that have issued as patents").
111. See Note, Developments Under FOZ4-1978, supra note 2, at 354.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 are the rules for discovery in federal civil litigation.
114. 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979). The lower court decisions are discussed in Note, Developments
Under FOI4-1977,supra note 2, at 222 n.215; Note, Developments Under FOIA-1976, supra
note 2, at 539-41.
115. 12 C.F.R. § 271.5 (1979).
116. The Federal Open Market Committee regulates the money supply and federal funds rate
(the rate at which banks will lend or borrow immediately available reserves on an overnight basis)
by purchasing or selling securities in the open market. Selling securities decreases bank reserves
and thereby diminishes investment activity; buying securities has the opposite effect. The committee meets monthly to formulate monetary policy for the upcoming period, and sets out its decisions in the directives. After the effective period of a directive has passed, the Federal Open
Market Committee releases it for publication in the Federal Register. Merrill sued to compel
earlier disclosure. See the discussion in 99 S. Ct. at 2803-05.
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immediate disclosure, as ordered by the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia "would seriously interfere with the conduct of na11t 7
tional monetary policy.
With two Justices dissenting," 8 the Supreme Court ruled that

under Exemption 5, the Federal Open Market Committee could delay
publishing the directives, if they "contain sensitive information not
otherwise available, and if immediate release of these Directives would
significantly harm the Government's monetary functions or commercial interests,""19 as the Federal Open Market Committee claimed.' 20
The Court held that the directives were clearly intra-agency memoranda: the Federal Open Market Committee satisfied the Administra-

tive Procedure Act's definition of "agency,"' 2 and the directives were
written instructions to the Federal Open Market Committee's Account
Manager, who carries out the policies set forth therein.
On the more difficult and significant question of the applicability
of a privilege that would make the document nondiscoverable, the
Court determined that the records "would not be available by law to a
party . . .in litigation with the agency."'

22

Although the directives

were not subject to the attorney-client privilege, the attorney's work
product privilege, or the executive privilege for predecisional delibera-

tions within the agency' 23-the only privileges the Court had previously recognized in Exemption 5124--4he majority nevertheless held
117. Id at 2807. The Federal Open Market Committee conceded that the directives were
"statements of general policy ... formulated and adopted by the agency," that had to be "currently publish[ed] in the Federal Register" under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 2807.
However, the Federal Open Market Committee argued that it was not subject to the current publication requirements because of the applicability of a section 552(b) exemption. The Court commented that there was no conflict between a finding that the directives were final opinions yet
exempt under subsection (b)(5), because it was not relying on the privilege for predecisional communications. 99 S.Ct. at 2812-13 n.23. See Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 476 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1979).
118. Justices Stevens and Stewart dissented. See notes 131-37 infra and accompanying text.
119. 99 S. Ct. at 2814.
120. The Court instructed the district court on remand to determine if the Federal Open Market -Committee's claims were correct with regard to all, or any portion, of the records. Id
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 552(e) (1976). Section 552(e) provides:
For purposes of this section, the term "agency"1 as defined in section 551(1) of this
title includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation,
Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of
the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or an independent
regulatory agency.
122. 99 S. Ct. at 2808 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976)).
123. The Federal Open Market Committee did not contend that these privileges protected the
documents. 99 S.Ct. at 2809 & n.14.
124. The Court had been persuaded to recognize these privileges because they were expressly
mentioned in the legislative history and not duplicated in any of the Act's other exemptions. Id
at 2809-10. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973).
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that the exemption did apply to the directives. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, explained that Exemption 5 includes a privilege for
confidential commercial information pertaining to government contracts. In support of this holding, he referred to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(7), which states that a court may, "for good cause
shown,. . . [issue a protective order] that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."' 125 Although the
Court recognized that the FOIA's legislative history provided less support for including this privilege in Exemption 5 than for incorporating
the executive and attorney-client privileges, it nonetheless found a suffi-

cient foundation in the House Report and House and Senate committee
hearings. 126 For example, agencies testifying at hearings preceding the

FOIA's enactment expressed concern about the disclosure of confidential commercial information. In addition, the House Report on the

FOIA states that Exemption 5 is intended to exempt from disclosure
"documents or information which it has received or generated before it

completes the process of awarding a contract .... ,,127 Given the
agency concerns and this statement from the House Report, the Court
decided that it was appropriate to infer that Exemption 5 incorporates

"a limited privilege for confidential commercial information pertaining

to [government] contracts."' 128 The Court also concluded that the Do-

mestic Policy Directives, which relate to the government's purchase
and sale of securities, "are substantially similar to confidential commercial information generated in the process of awarding a contract."' 129 Therefore, upon a showing (to the district court) that
immediate disclosure would have a serious detrimental effect,' 30 the di-

rectives would be exempt.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). "And we see no reason why the Government could not, in an
appropriate case, obtain a protective order under Rule 26(c)(7)." 99 S. Ct. at 2810.
126. 99 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
127. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 29, at 10, reprintedin [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2427.
128. 99 S. Ct. at 2812. The Court ruled that this privilege would not duplicate other privileges
in Exemption 5 or elsewhere in the FOIA. By reaching this result the Court avoided a decision on
two other privileges the Federal Open Market Committee asserted: first, a privilege for official
government information whose release would not be in the public interest, and second, a privilege
based on FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2), permitting a court to restrict discovery to a designated time or
place. 99 S. Ct. at 2810 n.17. The Court began its analysis, however, by rejecting the Federal
Open Market Committee's claim that Exemption 5 authorizes an agency to delay disclosure of
intra-agency memoranda "that would undermine the effectiveness of the agency's policy if released immediately. . ., even if the memoranda in question could be routinely discovered by a
party in civil litigation with the agency." Id at 2809.
129. 99 S. Ct. at 2813.
130. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
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Justice Stevens' dissent, which Justice Stewart joined "insofar as it
expresses views concerning the 'legal question' presented,"' 31 attacked
the majority's reading of the fifth exemption. In a lengthy footnote,
Justice Stevens explained why he was not persuaded by the majority's
analysis of the legislative history:
[The Court states] that only those privileges that are recognized in
the legislative history of FOIA should be incorporated in the exemption. To the extent, however, that every reference in the subcommittee hearings to the danger of disclosing some type of governmental
information suffices under this test-virtually every agency appeared
before Congress with a list of such "dangers"--the exemption would
render the Act meaningless. On the other hand, if the Court's test is
designed to limit Exemption 5 to those references in the legislative
history that clearly bear on Congress' final understanding of the Act,
I see no justification for the Court's recognition of32a vague "commercial information" component of that exemption.'

A proper reading of the legislative history, according to the dissent,
demonstrates that Congress decided not to incorporate a "commercial
133
information" exemption into the FOIA.
The dissent also argued that the idea of a "temporary" exemption,
as permitted by the majority, is not consistent with the FOIA provision
that the disclosure requirement "does not apply" when one of the exemptions is pertinent. 134 Of course, the majority's reliance on Rule
131. 99 S. Ct. at 2814 n.* Justice Stevens supplemented his own legal analysis by expressing
his view-and that of several economists-that disclosure would be beneficial to the market. Id
at 2814-15 & n.l.
132. Id at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
133. The dissent stated:
First, the passage in the House Report that the Court relies on... is rather clearly
directed both at a different governmental activity (I e., procurement of goods or services
by the government acting as commercial buyer) and at a different stage in the course of
that activity (le., "before it completes its process") than is involved in this case. Here,
the agency is engaged in a clearly governmental activity--the regulation of financial
markets-and has already settled upon its final position and has acted upon it. Moreover, the absence in the Senate Report of even this thin reed to support the Court's
analysis is significant in light of our recognition that that report, rather than the House
Report, is the most accurate reflection of the congressional will with respect to FOIA.
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363-367. . . .Finally, the fact that
Congress did include a "commercial information" exemption in the Act, albeit one that
clearly does not apply in this case-Exemption 4--should persuasively counsel against
our adopting a novel and strained interpretation of another exemption to encompass
such information. This is particularly so in this case in view of the fact that the very
agency involved here unsuccessfully requested that Congress amend the proposed Exemption 4 to provide protection for the policy directives involved in this case. Hearings
on H.R. 5012, etc. before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 55, 228, 229 (1965). Having failed to provide such
protection in Exemption 4, which so clearly relates to commercial information, Congress
will no doubt be surprised to find that the Court has read that protection into Exemption 5.
99 S.Ct. at 2815 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). See note 29 sulpra.
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26(c)(7), which empowers courts to order that records "be disclosed
only in a designated way,"' 35 supports the allowance of a temporary

delay in disclosure. Although the majority opinion is logical in a technical sense, it does violence to the spirit of the Act. Congress did not

intend to enact a statute with a middle ground "[b]etween 'current' release and total exemption,"'

36

and the Court's extension of Exemption

5 is even more suspect as a result. While the Court's desire to protect
the national monetary policy is understandable, the dissent's approach
is more honest to the FOIA and properly leaves such policy decisions
37
to the legislature.'
B.

TraditionalDiscovery and the FOl4.

Whereas most Exemption 5 cases in 1979 involved straightforward
applications of accepted legal principles to the particular documents
withheld by the agencies, 138 several cases required courts to address the

more complex issue of the relative availability of information to litigants seeking disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
the one hand and the FOJA on the other. In Canal Authority v.
Froehlke, 3 9 the plaintiff sought information through the normal discovery process. The defendants, relying on claims of exemption under
135. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(c)(7).
136. 99 S. Ct. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. This is especially true since Congress was aware of the problem and chose not to resolve
the issue in this statute. See note 133 supra. The dissent's position, however-at least if the majority is correct in concluding that the government could assert the confidential commercial information privilege in discovery disputes-leads to the odd result that material exempt from discovery
must be disclosed under the FOIA.
138. See, e.g., Murphy v. Department of the Army, No. 78-1258 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1979)
(disclosure to a Congressman acting in his official capacity does not waive the Exemption 5 privilege); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979) (analyses based upon public record
that are prepared by outside consultants at agency's request are exempt as part of deliberative
process); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (exemption for predecisional advice
does not apply to memorandum adopted by agency as statement of policy and interpretation of
Internal Revenue Code); Pies v. IRS, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9571 (D.D.C. 1979) (draft of proposed
regulation, treated as final work product, is not exempt as predecisional advice); Kanter v. Department of State, 479 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1979) (predecisional legal advice); Hearnes v. IRS, 79-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9526 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (discussing the attorney-client, work product, and executive
privileges); Brinton v. United States Dep't of State, 476 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1979) (attorneyclient privilege not waived by public statements of agency officials that utilize the contents of
documents without referring to the actual documents), as amended (Sept. 21, 1979); Grolier, Inc.
v. FTC, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,698 (D.D.C. 1979) (incorporation of predecisional memorandum
into final decision); Tabcor Sales Clearing, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 471 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (executive privilege, discussing predecisional-postdecisional and opinion-fact
tests); Mallin v. NLRB, 101 L.R.R.M. 2656 (N.D. IM. 1979) (predecisional memoranda); Dick v.
IRS, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9315 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (predecisional memoranda); Eisenberg v. IRS, 79I U.S. Tax Cas. 9314 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (predecisional legal advice).
139. 81 F.R.D. 609 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
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the FOIA, refused to produce the documents. Rejecting this position,

the district court concluded that "the FOIA and its exclusionary provisions are irrelevant to a motion to compel discovery under the Federal
Rules"; 140 le., the FOIA places no limits on the discovery process.
This differs from the situation inACLU v. Brown,' 4' in which the court
determined that in civil discovery it is proper to review a claim of ex-

emption under the state secrets privilege by looking to the FOIA's national security exemption' 42 for guidance. CanalAulhor/y declined to

exempt documents from discovery solely because they could have been
withheld if requested under the FOIA; in4CLU v. Brown,143 the FOIA

merely provided the standards by which to review a claim of privilege
that the court recognized as applicable in the discovery context.'4
Even when a court looks to the FOIA for guidance in a discovery
dispute, the Act can suggest only a tentative solution. All courts acknowledge that whereas a litigant's need for the requested information
can overcome a claim of privilege in discovery, need is irrelevant in an
FOIA action.145 A good example of this principle is the criminal case
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id at 613.
609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976).
609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979).

144. In accord with both cases is McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979). As in
CanalAuthority,the court found reliance on FOIA exemptions to be misplaced. The court determined that the materials were discoverable unless the executive privilege applied; accordingly, it
turned to Exemption 5 case law for guidance on this point. In fact, the records in McClel/andhad
been requested under the FOIA. The court chose, however, to ignore the form of the request and
to treat it as one for discovery in the administrative proceeding between the parties. As long as the
court treats the request as arising under the FOIA or under discovery procedure-without giving
the requester benefits of both procedures-this "switch" seems unobjectionable on FOIA grounds.
Many courts have applied Exemption 5 cases by way of analogy in civil discovery disputes
over an assertion of privilege. Justice Brennan, for example, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
193-94 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part), described the executive privilege by referring to the
Court's Exemption 5 cases. However, since the fifth exemption does not include all discovery
privileges (see notes 124 & 128 supra and accompanying text with regard to the Supreme Court's
attempt to avoid duplicating privileges found in other exemptions by incorporating them in Exemption 5), it may be appropriate, as in ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979), to look to
other FOIA exemptions as well.
145. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 n.16 (1975); McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d at 1287 n.54; ACLU v. Brown, 609 F.2d at 280; id at 284 n.1 (Cummings, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dema v. IRS, No. 78-3992 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1979).
Agencies considering an FOIA request should ignore the requester's status as a member of the
press. Spectator Publishing Co. v. CIA, No. 78-1705 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1979). But V. Koch &
Rubin, A Proposalfora ComprehensiveRestructuringofthe PublicInformationSystem, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 1,35-39 (arguing that the press and independent researchers should be provided with greater
access to information than the general public). The political status of the requester is also irrelevant. Hearnes v. IRS, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9526, at 87,876 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (former governor).
An interesting problem is presented when a litigant attempts to use the FOIA, rather than the
discovery process, to get information helpful for his case. In Cooper v. Department of the Navy,
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Irving v. DiLapi,46 in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision that union authorization cards should
be disclosed to the defendants pursuant to their subpoena. 147 Acknowledging that the cards would be exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA, 48 the court nevertheless ordered production because the defendant's need for the material outweighed the government's (public's)
interest in confidentiality. While these cases do not effect radical
changes in the law, they do help clarify an area important under both
the FOIA and the Federal Rules.
V.

A.

INVESTIGATORY RECORDS EXEMPTION

Law Enforcement Purposes.

Exemption 7 of the FOIA permits agencies to withhold "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,"' 49 if at least one
of six other conditions is met.' 50 The initial question in adjudicating
any Exemption 7 claim, therefore, is whether the records are both investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes. Records do
594 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 266 (1979), survivors of a helicopter crash requested
access to an agency's report about the accident. The court ordered disclosure, finding that the
agency had waived any Exemption 5 privilege when it released the report more widely than necessary in carrying out the government's purpose of assembling the report. Of special concern to the
court was that the opposing counsel in the case was given access to the report:
It is intolerable that such confidential documents should be furnished to one side of
a lawsuit and not to the other.... [Wlhere, as here, a company representative primarily
concerned with litigation is, pursuant to wearing his 'other hat'-a subsidiary responsibility for aircraft design and operational safety, permitted general access to guarded matter and a copy of it appears in defense counsers hands, a determination that its
confidentiality has been waived is not clearly wrong. . . .[L]ike rank, privileges such as
these carry corresponding responsibilities, and we concur in the district court's refusal to
permit them to be trifled with as they were here.
Id at 488. Insofar as the court actually based its conclusion on the waiver, it is clearly correct;
insofar as the litigant's need figured in the decision, the court is clearly wrong.
146. 600 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 137 (1979).
147. Although Irving was a criminal case, the holding should apply to civil litigation as well.
148. 600 F.2d at 1035 n.6 (citing Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978)
and Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977)). Whether union authorization cards should be considered exempt from FOIA disclosure is discussed in Note, Developments Under FOL4-1978, supra note 2, at 344-45.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
150. The records are exempt
[o]nly to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
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not satisfy this requirement, for example, if submitted to an agency for
other purposes but later used in a law enforcement investigation.'15 In
Pope v. UnitedStates,152 a Fifth Circuit panel determined that Internal
Revenue Service documents containing unsolicited information about
misconduct by a lawyer, "where the information subsequently led to
53
the consideration of disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer,"'
fell within Exemption 7. The court found that the informants "obviously intended that the information provoke or contribute to an IRS
investigation of [the attorney] and various other individuals, and the
information was in fact incorporated into an investigation of appellee's
fitness to practice before the IRS."'154 The records were thus investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes.
The timing of the law enforcement investigation can be critical. In
Gregory v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corp.,155 a district court rejected

an Exemption 7 claim, stating: "Unless the information was originally
gathered for law enforcement purposes, the subsequent inclusion of the
material in an investigative report does not affect its characterization
under exemption seven."' 156 The documents in question related to
"routine oversight of a federal program."' 157 The court granted summary judgment to the FOIA requester on this issue.
Two courts reached different results in 1979 on whether records
compiled during improper FBI investigations are exempt as "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes."'' 58 In Lamont v.
Department of Justice,'5 9 the government attempted to withhold
records of a thirty-year investigation of the plaintiff's activities, conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The government relied
heavily on the Smith Act,' 60 which makes it unlawful to advocate the
overthrow of the government,'61 to demonstrate that the records were
compiled for law enforcement purposes. The court rejected the govern151. Ellsworth, Exemption 7 of the FOIA: Law Enforcement Records, in LITIGATION UNDER
THE AMENDED FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 57 (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978).
152. 599 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1979).
153. Id at 1384.
154. Id at 1386.
155. 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979). For a discussion of the Exemption 8 aspects of this case
see text accompanying notes 189-96 infra.
156. 470 F. Supp. at 1334.
157. Id
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
159. 475 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
160. Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976)).
161. Under the Act, it is a felony to belong to an organization that advocates the overthrow of
the government. The Act provides in part:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
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ment's argument and concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's
62
restrictive interpretation of the Smith Act's membership provision

after 1955,163 the Federal Bureau of Investigation could not reasonably,
and in good faith, have believed that Lamont had violated the law.

Therefore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had not collected the
information for any law enforcement purpose, but rather as part of its

general monitoring and surveillance of Lamont. Applying a test of
whether the agency believed in good faith that the subject of its investigation had violated the law, the court denied the government's Exemption 7 claim, subject to the introduction of further proof of the

investigation's law enforcement purpose.

64

Irons v. Bell,1 65 a First Circuit case decided several months before

the Southern District of New York's Lamont opinion, established a generic classification of Federal Bureau of Investigation investigatory
files as Exemption 7 "records." The court found that the Bureau had
established no particular law enforcement purpose for the investiga-

tion, rejecting "the proposition that merely associating and expressing
opposition to government policies, without more, triggers an FBI obligation to conduct a lengthy investigation and infiltration of political
and religious associations."1 66 Nevertheless, the court concluded that
Exemption 7 did apply, because of the FBI's status "as an agency

whose functions are almost entirely limited to the enforcement of federal law."1 67 The Irons opinion explained that the law enforcement
purpose of the particular investigation is irrelevant when the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is involved.
The character of the materials excluded under Exemption 7 at least
suggests that "law enforcement purpose" is as much a description of
government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of,or affiliates with, any such
society, group, or assembly ofpersons, knowing thepurposesthereof-

Shall be fined not more than $20,000, or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both ....
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976) (emphasis added).
162. Id The FBI argued that Lamont was under investigation for violating this provision.
163. The Court's decisions in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), construed the Act's membership provision as requiring "active membership" and "specific intent" to aid the overthrow of the government. 367 U.S. at 221-24; 354
U.S. at 319-20.
164. 475 F. Supp. at 780.
165. 596 F.2d 468 (Ist Cir. 1979).
166. Id at 472. The investigation concerned the requester's participation in various political
organizations and race-related demonstrations. The court agreed with the district court that the
FBI's affidavit indicated that the investigation had no law enforcement purpose. The court began
its analysis by rejecting the requester's argument that the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976),
entitled him to the records. "[Tihe Privacy Act adds nothing to appellee's rights under FOIA."
596 F.2d at 471.
167. 596 F.2d at 473.
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the type of agency the exemption is aimed at as it is a condition on
the use of the exemption by agencies having administrative as well as

civil enforcement duties. We see strong policy reasons supporting
this reading of "law enforcement purpose" which would, assuming
other conditions are met, extend the exemption
to all investigative
files of a criminal law enforcement agency.' 68
The court reasoned that if it did not label the files "law enforcement
records," even the presence of one of the six enumerated harms required to exempt such records from disclosure would not permit the
agency to withhold them. Furthermore, the court noted that determining whether each investigation had a law enforcement purpose "would
place an unmanageable burden upon district courts. Few cases would
be as obvious as this at the affidavit stage."169 In support of its position,
the Irons court cited various statements in the legislative history, including several references to Exemption 7 records as "investigatory
records of the FBI."170 Reading the legislative history as showing that
"investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently
records compiled for 'law enforcement purposes' within the meaning of
Exemption 7,"171 the opinion noted that "further legislation and not the
FOIA, should define and provide sanctions for unjustified surveillance
activity." 172
On balance, the approach of the Lamont court seems more defensible than that of the Irons decision. The Irons court's refusal to "burden" the courts with making decisions such as those made in Lamont is
difficult to reconcile with the FOIA's provisions for in camera inspection and de novo review, 173 which indicate that courts are expected to
do more than accept an agency's position at face value. Moreover, the
Irons court's other policy justification-that a contrary holding would
mandate disclosure of information that invades personal privacy or
identifies a confidential source--overlooks the simple fact that Exemption 7, by encompassing only certain types of records whose disclosure
would cause the enumerated harms, requires disclosure of other
records whose release would have the same effect. Finally, the First
Circuit's reliance on the legislative history is misplaced. The sources
cited do not indicate that the speakers contemplated illegal Federal
Bureau of Investigation activity as well as good faith efforts to enforce
168. Id at 474.
169. Id
170. Id at 475 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 17,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy), 120 CONG.
Rac. 36,878 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bayh), 120 CONG. REC. 36,879 (remarks of Sen. Mondale)).
171. 596 F.2d at 475.
172. Id at 474 n.13.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
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the law.174 The FOIA, enacted as a mechanism to allow public oversight of government, 175 was not meant to shield unauthorized agency
activity. 176
B.

Interference With Enforcement Proceedings.
Under Exemption 7(A) of the FOIA, law enforcement records are

not subject to disclosure if their release would "interfere with enforcement proceedings." 177 In 1978 the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Robbins

Tire & Rubber Co. ,178 interpreted this provision to exempt, as a class,
statements by witnesses given to the National Labor Relations Board in
pending unfair labor practice proceedings. Federal courts dealing with
Exemption 7(A) in 1979 utilized the Robbins Tire decision, and the rationale behind it, to decide analogous issues.
In Nemacolin Mines Corp. v. NLRAB, 179 the district court denied the

NLRB's claim of exemption for witness statements given in the course
of an unfair labor practice investigation that had been completed in all
174. See legislative history cited at note 170 supra. In fact, the cited remarks of Senator Bayh
contain a laudatory reference to the FOIA for its role in uncovering questionable counterintelligence activities. 120 CONG. Rac. 36,878 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
175. See generally 1 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES,
FORMS AND THE LAW §§ 2.01, 4.01 (1979), and authorities cited therein.
Legislative intent provided the basis for the decision in Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602
F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1979), in which a requester sought information obtained by means of illegal
electronic surveillance. The court reversed the district court's order to disclose, citing Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). Regardless of the possible Exemption 3 status of that statute, the court held that the act showed a congressional balancing of the sort required under Exemption 7(C) between privacy and the public's
interest in disclosure. According to the court, "Congress had decided that the risk to privacy
created by illegal electronic surveillance is too great to permit any disclosure of the fruits of such
surveillance." 602 F.2d at 1013. The court did not dwell on whether the records were investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes despite the illegality. Unlike the situations
presented in Irons and Lamont, the investigation in ProvidenceJournalwas itself legal although
the means of obtaining information were not.
176. On June 2, 1977, the Deputy Attorney General sent a memorandum to Justice Department officials urging that Exemption 7 "not be used to conceal unlawful activities, regardless of
the intent with which those activities were conducted ....
Neither the use nor methodology of
unlawful investigative techniques or procedures is to be protected by reliance on [Exemption 7]."
Memorandum from Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, to Quin Shea, Director, Office of
Information and Privacy Appeals (June 2, 1977), reprintedin LIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT app. 96 (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976).
178. 437 U.S. 214 (1978), discussedin Note, Developments UnderFOJA4-1978, supra note 2, at
339-43, 345-47. For a criticism of the Robbins Tire decision and a discussion of its impact, see
Note, NLRB Discovery After Robbins: More PerilforPrivateLitigants,47 FORDHAM L. REv. 393
(1978). The author bemoans the Supreme Court's reduction of the availability of the FOIA for
use as a discovery tool. However, this analysis apparently misses the point that it was not the
purpose of the Act to serve as a mechanism for discovery.
179. 467 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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respects. The National Labor Relations Board argued that disclosure
would interfere with future enforcement proceedings by diminishing
the agency's ability to induce informants to make statements. According to the plaintiff-requester, on the other hand, statements are exempt
only during proceedings in which they are potentially useful. Judge
McCune adopted the requester's position, holding that Exemption 7(A)
does not bar "post-enforcement disclosure of statements made to the
NLRB while investigating an unfair labor practice charge." 180
The court distinguished Robbins Tire on the facts and demonstrated that the Supreme Court's rationale for holding the statements

exempt in that case required a finding of no exemption in Nemacoln.
In Robbins Tire, the witness statements were sought before the hearing

on the unfair labor practice charge as a means of supplementing-indeed, circumventing-the National Labor Relations Board's discovery
procedures. The Supreme Court was concerned that prehearing disclosure would interfere with the particular proceeding,"8 " and the Court
noted the same concern in the legislative history. But, as the Nemacolin
court indicated, "[w]here the administrative agency has no intention to
use the statements in later enforcement proceedings, there are no 'en-

forcement proceedings' which disclosure could disrupt."' 82 Therefore,
the court found that Exemption 7(A) did not authorize the National
Labor Relations Board to withhold the documents, regardless of the
180. Id at 523.
181. The concern is that witnesses will be intimidated, or that the company will construct
defenses that cause the violations to go unremedied. 437 U.S. at 241. These concerns are present
whenever there is an "imminent adjudicatory proceeding." Clements Wire & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
589 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1979) (extending Robbins Tire to union elections).
An interesting summary of the cases appears in Judge Goldberg's opinion for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson Greenwood & Co. v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1979). The court held
exempt NLRB witness statements procurred during an investigation of a challenged representative election, an issue similar to that decided the same day in Red Food Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 604
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1979). Judge Goldberg opined:
Our decision in Robbins Tire,
Interpreting Congresses' reported desires,
Exposed workers to their bosses' ire.
The High Court, avoiding this sticky quagmire,
And fearing employers would threaten to fire,
Sent our holding to the funeral pyre.
Then along came Clements Wire,
Soon after its venerable sire.
To elections, Wire extended Tire,
Leaving app'llees arguments higher and drier.
Now to colors our focus must shift,
To Green wood and stores that are Red.
We hope this attempt at a rhyme, perhaps two,
Has not left this audience feeling too blue.
604 F.2d at 323 (footnotes omitted).
182. 467 F. Supp. at 524. The court cited Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976), in
support of its restrictive construction of "enforcement proceedings." 467 F. Supp. at 524.
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validity of the National Labor Relation Board's fears that disclosure
1 83
would jeopardize unrelated future proceedings.
While the Nemacolin case distinguished Robbins Tire so as to
reach an opposite result, other courts extended the Robbins Tire generic
exemption to the analogous facts present in their cases. In NLRB v.
Croft Metals, Inc., 184 a Fifth Circuit panel held that contempt proceedings before a special master are enforcement proceedings to which the
exemption applies. The court acknowledged that the proceedings were
not identical, but saw the essential circumstances-the prosecutorial
function and the statute being enforced' 85-as the same.1 86 Another
court applied the Robbins Tire holding to a situation in which the witness' statement, located in a file on a withdrawn charge, was relevant to
a second, pending proceeding.1 87 Once the National Labor Relations
Board demonstrated the affidavit's relevance to the pending proceeding, it was exempt under Exemption 7(A) without a "particularized
1' 88
showing of potential harm from disclosure."
183. The court also rejected the claim of exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D), which
allows agencies to withhold law enforcement records if disclosure would identify a confidential
source. Two factors influenced this conclusion. First, every National Labor Relations Board declarant signs a statement that he has been assured confidentiality until and unless he is called to
testify as a witness at the hearing.
Since the declarant could expect, at the time his statement was given, to be called as a
witness by the NLRB, his justifiable expectation of protection at that time is the protection given to a witness. As a result, disclosure does not substantially compromise the
justifiable expectations of the declarant.
467 F. Supp. at 525. Second, the National Labor Relations Board purports to grant confidentiality
to all declarants by use of the statement referred to above. The court opined that its holding
might differ if only reluctant sources were assured of confidentiality. "[Eixemption 7(D) requires
the grant of confidentiality to be made on the basis of good faith discretion, not on the basis of
arbitrary rule, as the grant was made in this case." Id But see Pacheco v. FBI, 470 F. Supp. 1091,
1100-01 (D.P.R. 1979). In Pacheco the court held that Exemption 7(D) exempted the records
although the government's affidavit stated that some of the information concerned witnesses to
crimes who might be called upon to testify publicly. The court apparently accepted the Bureau's
argument that the informants had all received implied assurances of confidentiality. Nemacolin
and Pacheco may be distinguishable, however, in that the FBI, as a criminal law enforcement
agency, receives greater protection under Exemption 7(D). See note 150 supra.
184. 100 L.R.R.M. 2426 (5th Cir. 1979).
185. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
186. 100 L.R.R.M. at 2427.
187. Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979).
188. Id at 1329. Three cases not dealing with the NLRB used Robbins Tire to resolve the
subsection (b)(7)(A) claim. See Stephenson v. IRS, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9513 (N.D. Ga. 1979);
Kanter v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Steinberg v. IRS, 463 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (S.D.
Fla. 1979). All three courts held that the exemption applied (citing Robbins Tire), because disclosure would prejudice the government's case. Steinberg also relied on Robbins Tire for the proposition that the FOIA was not meant to be a private discovery tool in ongoing criminal litigation. Id
at 1274. See also Grabinski v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
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Exemption 8 of the FOIA provides that the Act's disclosure provisions do not apply to matters "contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use
of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions."' 189 This exemption has produced little litigation in the
thirteen years since the FOIA's enactment; only Exemption 9190 has
produced less. 19' In Gregory v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 192
however, a district court discussed the applicability of Exemption 8 to a
request for records from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
which, as the insurer, possessed the records of a closed bank.
The narrow question for decision in Gregory was whether the exemption permitted agencies to withhold records concerning closed
banks. The court held that it did not, despite the court's agreement
with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that the statute does
not differentiate between open and closed banks. "The FDIC is correct
in asserting that these documents fall within the plain language of the
statute. . . [But] when a literal reading leads to an unreasonable result, a court can look behind the plain meaning of the statute."'' 93 According to the district judge, the exemption's plain meaning would seal
the bank's records for all time, even if the bank had been closed for
many years.
The Gregory court determined that exempting records of closed
banks would not further either of the provision's two purposes. The
exemption would not help maintain the bank's financial integrity, for
"[o]nce a bank has been closed, its financial soundness cannot be undermined."1 94 Therefore, a literal reading of the statute would be irrelevant in effectuating its "central purpose."' 9 5 Moreover, permitting the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to withhold the records would
not further the statute's second goal of safeguarding the bank-agency
relationship. The opinion cautioned against being so concerned with
good relations that the purpose of regulation is forgotten, and noted
that good relations are certainly immaterial in the context of a closed
189. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976).
190. Id § 552(b)(9), which exempts "geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells."
191. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5:41 (2d ed. 1978).
192. 470 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979).
193. Id at 1332.
194. Id at 1333. See generaly Consumers Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir.

1978).
195. 470 F. Supp. at 1332.
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bank. 196 Because the literal interpretation would lead to an unreasonable result, without any countervailing suggestion by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that disclosure was problematic, the court
rejected the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's claim of exemp-

tion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Litigation under the FOIA in 1979 resolved fewer issues than it
left open. The Supreme Court's pronouncements in Chrysler and Merrill failed to settle even the particular disputes under consideration.
Furthermore, the Court's reasoning was inconclusive (Chrysler) and
unsatisfying (Merrill). The circuit and district courts made progress in
certain areas, most notably with regard to applying the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Robbins Tire1 97 and refining the relationship
between the FOIA and the discovery process. Again, however, the disturbing developments overshadowed the positive accomplishments.
Conflicts erupted between courts over the exempt status of consumer
product information and records of unlawful criminal investigations.
Moreover, rumblings in the Congress concerning request delays and
records of national intelligence agencies forbode the injection of new
uncertainties into the law.' 98 In sum, the year's FOIA developments
demonstrated that the area of federal information disclosure is one of
constant and unpredictable change.
Alan S. Madans

196. Id at 1333.
197. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
198. See notes 87 & 107 supra.

